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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAVIS WILLIAMS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Case No. 15934 
The nature of the case and disposition in the lower court 
are thoroughly discussed in Appellant's initial brief, and will 
not be repeated here. For convenience, reference to the 
Respondent's brief will be shown as (R's brief), and the 
Transcript of Trial as (Tr.). 
ARGUMENT 
~hether Mr. !1eikle was acting as an agent for defendant 
First Colon:' or an independent broker is a question of fact to 
be determined by the trier of fact. 
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Respondent cites in his brief, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 31-17-2 (1953), which section provides: 
"A 'Broker' is any person who, on behalf 
of the insured, for compensation as an 
independent contractor, or commission, 
or fee, and not being an agent of the 
insurer, solicits, negotiates, or procures 
insurance or reinsurance or the renewal or 
continuance thereof . (Emphasis added). 
Respondent cites this Section to support his position that 
Mr. Meikle was in fact a broker at the time of his solicitation 
of plaintiff and her husband and not an insurance agent of the 
defendant. Respondent, however, fails to cite Utah Code 
Annotated § 31-17-l (1953), which defines an insurance agent 
as: 
"i'.r~. ;:-p-cc:::n authorized by an insurer 
on its behalf to solicit applications for 
insurance, to effectuate and countersign 
insurance contracts except as to life or 
disability insurances, and to collect 
premiums or insurances so applied for or 
effectuated . 
An insurance "broker" as defined, supra, become· an agent of 
an insurance company when he, on behalf of the insurer, 
"solicits applications" and "collects premiums". 
Appellant's brief as filed herein, clearly establishes 
the fact that Mr. Meikle solicited an application of insurance 
on behalf of the defendant and with defendant's knowledge and 
accepted plaintiff's first premium payment on the insurance 
applied for. 
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Respondent at page 25 of its brief cites Couch, 
Insurance, 2d §§ 25:92 wherein Couch states: 
"Whether a person acts as a broker or an 
agent is not determined by what he is called 
but is to be determined from what he does." 
Appellant agrees with this statement, and asserts that the 
following facts support a showing that Mr. Meikle was acting 
as an agent of defendant First Colony in his negotiations with 
the plaintiff: 
1. Meikle procured from defendant or its agent at least one 
application form for insurance with the defendant; 
2. Meikle approached plaintiff and her husband with 
defendant's application for insurance; 
3. Meikle suggested to plaintiff and her husband that 
they should buy insurance with defendant; 
4. Meikle accepted from plaintiff the first premium payment 
for insurance with the defendant; 
5. Meikle executed the receipt delivered to Mrs. Williams 
as agent for the defendant and specifically presented himself as 
agent of defendant on the receipt. 
6. Meikle dealt directly with the defendant in the 
transmittal of said premium payment. 
· th case of Barnett v. State Automobile Respondent cltes e 
and casua~ty underwriters, 26 U.2d 169, P.2d 311 (1971) to support 
· t adheres to the rule that negotiations his assertion that thls Cour 
between an insurance salesman and a person seeking insurance 
-3-
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coverage create an agency relationship between the two if the 
salesman is not bound to place the insurance in a company which 
he normally represents. However, such an assertion is not 
supported by the Barnett case. In Barnett, the court held that: 
"where a soliciting agent promises a customer 
that he will notify him before the contract of 
insurance exrires, or where, as in this case, 
he permits a custom or usage to arise which re-
quires him to give the insuran8~ notice of the 
expiration date, he is acting as the agent of 
the insured and not the insurer, since such an 
agent may place the next term of insurance 
with another company if he cares to do so." 
Such a holding does not apply to the creation of an insurance 
contact by an agent authorized to solicit insurance on behalf 
of the insurance company. 
Contrary to respondent's claims, the cases cited in 
Appellant's brlef do support the proposition that Meikle was, 
in fact, an agent of defendant First Colony. In Imperial Casu-
alty & Indemnity Company v. Carolina Gas Insurance Company, 
402 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1968), the Iowa court held that under 
Iowa law: 
"any person soliciting insurance or procuring 
an application therefor shall be held to be the 
soliciting agent of the insurance company." 
In Prassel Enterprises, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
405 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1968), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that a soliciting agent, even though 
he's not a general agent of the insurance company, is an aoent 
of the insurance company up to and including the consummation 
of the insurance agreement. 
-4-
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Houston Fire & Casualty Co. v. Jones, 315 F.2d 116 
(lOth Cir. 1963) stands for the proposition that although a 
salesman of the insurer's policy-writing agent had no specific 
contractual relationship with the insurer, the salesman, 
nevertheless, had implied authority to act as soliciting agent 
for the insurer and to bind the insurer by an insurance binder, 
when the salesman used approaches and forms sup?lied him by the 
insurer to sell insurance. The facts in the Houston Fire case 
are very similar to the facts of this case. Mr. Meikle was 
supplied forms by the defendant for the purpose of soliciting 
insurance for and on behalf of the defendant. 
Perhaps the most significant case cited by Appe~lant's 
brief is the case of Ferrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance 
~, 120 Utah 109, 232 P.2d 754 (1950). While Respondent gues 
to great length to distinguish the Ferrington case from this 
case, he fails to recognize the fact that the first question 
to be determined in this case is whether Mr. Meikle was in fact 
acting as a broker or an agent of the defendant when he 
approached plaintiff and plaintiff's husband with defendant's 
application for insurance. In the Ferrington case this court 
addressed itself to that very question, wher the court stated: 
"Defendants insist ... throughout their 
brief that in connection with the ~lacement 
of this insurance that Bowman was 1n f~ct 
the agent for the plaintiff, w7 deem lt . 
unnecessary to set forth a deta1led analys1s 
of the various sections of the code because 
it was enacted primarily for the purpose of 
-5-
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regulating insurance companies, agents, 
brokers, solicitors and adjustors. It was 
not intended to change or control the ordi-
nary rules of agency between insurance 
companies and the public with whom they deal. 
If Bowman's conduct was in fact that of an 
agent for defendants, the licensing and regu-
latory provisions of the statute would not 
change that relationship so far as the plain-
tiff was concerned." 
Clearly, this case stands for the proposition that whether 
Meikle was an agent of the defendant is a question of fact 
to be determined by the actions of Mr. Meikle and the defendant 
insurance company and not by the provisions of the Utah code 
cited by the Respondent. 
Based upon the facts of this case and the authorities 
as cited herein and in Appellant's brief, the trier of fact 
could easily find that Meikle was an agent of the defendant 
First Colony. Inasmuch as there is a reasonable basis upon 
which a trier of fact could determine that fact, this Court 
should reverse the district court's granting of Summary Judgment 
and remand this case to the district court for trial upon the 
merits. 
Respectfully submitted this ~~day of February, 
1979. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
-6-
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CERTIFICATE OF ~~ILING 
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, postage prepaid 
to Respondent's Counsel, Robert M. HcDonald of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, BOO Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
utah 84111 this \ ~ day of February, 1979. 
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